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Abstract
Within the traditional Hilbert space formalism of quantum me-
chanics, it is not possible to describe a particle as possessing, simul-
taneously, a sharp position value and a sharp momentum value. Is
it possible, though, to describe a particle as possessing just a sharp
position value (or just a sharp momentum value)? Some, such as
Teller [21], have thought that the answer to this question is No —
that the status of individual continuous quantities is very different in
quantum mechanics than in classical mechanics. On the contrary, I
shall show that the same subtle issues arise with respect to contin-
uous quantities in classical and quantum mechanics; and that it is,
after all, possible to describe a particle as possessing a sharp position
value without altering the standard formalism of quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
Consider the following experimental setup: We have a source of quantum-
mechanical particles (e.g. electrons), a fluorescent screen, and a barrier be-
tween the source and the screen which has one or more openings. The barrier,
with its openings, prepares an ensemble of particles whose state, upon arrival
at the screen, is given by some wavefunction ψ. Let’s assume for simplicity
that the screen is one-dimensional and infinite in both directions (i.e., repre-
sented by R). The screen should be thought of as a measuring device for the
∗Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh; Email: hphst1@pitt.edu
1
position of particles in the ensemble, and we know that the pattern of shad-
ing on the screen will be distributed in accordance with the squared modulus
|ψ|2 of the wavefunction. For any individual particle in the ensemble, and
any region S on the screen,
∫
S |ψ|2 gives the probability that the screen will
flash inside S when the particle hits the screen. It would be very natural
then to attempt to interpret the probability distribution |ψ|2 as a measure of
our ignorance about the precise state of individual particles in the ensemble.
That is, it is natural to think that each particle in the ensemble does in fact
have a “sure-fire” (probability 1) disposition to be found at a certain point
λ ∈ R, and probabilities arise out of our ignorance about precisely which
point λ that is.
It is clear that the traditional interpretive obstacles in quantum theory do
not prevent us from thinking this way of this measurement. For one, since we
are not asking how a particle gets from the source to the screen, interference
effects play no role. Second, since we are in a position measurement context
(i.e., we are ignoring other observables such as momentum), there can be no
question of the no-hidden-variables theorems presenting any obstacles to our
thinking of |ψ|2 as a mixture of pure position states.
However, there remains a serious difficulty for supplying an ignorance in-
terpretation of |ψ|2: There does not appear to be any object in the standard
Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics (QM) which could represent
the state of an individual particle in the ensemble. According to Teller [21],
then, attempting to give an ignorance interpretation to |ψ|2 amounts to ques-
tioning the “descriptive completeness” of quantum theory:
“...if imprecise or imperfectly defined values of a continuous quan-
tity are to be explained in terms of assumed underlying states
with exact point values, these assumed underlying states cannot
be described within the theory, and the theory is descriptively
incomplete.” (p. 347)
But since QM is descriptively complete, |ψ|2 should not be interpreted as a
measure of our ignorance of the precise state of the individual particles.
Now it is certainly true that no vector in Hilbert space can be taken to
describe the state of an individual particle with a sharp location. This is
just the familiar point that operators with continuous spectra, like position,
have no eigenvectors. Furthermore, Gleason’s Theorem [11] entails that any
(pure) σ-additive probability measure on the logic of quantum propositions
(i.e., lattice of subspaces of a Hilbert space) is given by a vector ψ, via the
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standard formula E 7→ 〈ψ|Eψ〉. I believe, however, that the σ-additivity
assumption in Gleason’s theorem is too restrictive. Indeed, I will argue that
if we required σ-additivity of the states of a classical mechanical system,
then we would similarly have to conclude — in direct contradiction to what
we know to be true — that there can be no states assigning sharp values
to continuous quantities in that case as well. In fact, I will show that in
both cases it is possible to assign sharp values to continuous quantities using
finitely-additive (“singular”) states. I will also demonstrate that difficulties
which arise when using singular states in conjunction with the traditional
von Neumann account of ideal measurement are resolved when we adopt a
more realistic account of measurement.
2 Observables, properties, and states
It is well-known that there are methods of extending the Hilbert space for-
malism of QM so that it includes “generalized eigenstates” for continuous
spectrum observables (e.g., the rigged Hilbert space formalism). However,
these constructions are not needed for my purposes: Any continuous spec-
trum observable is associated with a Boolean algebra of spectral projections,
and a 2-valued homomorphism on this Boolean algebra gives a generalized
eigenstate. Furthermore, such homomorphisms should not be considered any
less a part of the Hilbert space formalism in the continuous case than they
are in the discrete case, where they just happen to be represented by proper
eigenvectors.
2.1 Preliminaries
I begin by establishing the terminology I will be using in this paper. Let
B be an arbitrary σ-complete Boolean algebra, with additive identity 0 and
multiplicative identity I. We say that ω is a state of B just in case ω is a
mapping of B into [0, 1] such that ω(I) = 1 and
ω(A ∨B) = ω(A) + ω(B), (1)
for each disjoint A,B ∈ B, i.e., A ∧B = 0. Clearly, the set of states on B is
a convex set. If ω is an extreme point among the states on B, we say that ω
is a pure state. That is, ω is pure just in case: If ω = aρ+(1− a)τ , for some
a ∈ (0, 1) and states ρ, τ on B, then ω = ρ = τ . The state ω is pure if and
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only if it is a Boolean homomorphism of B onto {0, 1}. If ω is not pure, we
say that ω is mixed. We say that a state ω is normal just in case
ω (∨∞i=1Ai) =
∞∑
i=1
ω(Ai), (2)
for each countable pairwise disjoint sequence {Ai} in B. If ω is not normal,
we say that ω is singular. Recall that a family F of elements in B is called
a filter just in case: (i) ∅ 6∈ F , (ii) A ∧ B ∈ F , when A,B ∈ F , and (iii) if
A ∈ F and A ≤ B, then B ∈ F . If, furthermore, either A ∈ F or ¬A ∈ F for
all A ∈ B, then F is said to be an ultrafilter. Each ultrafilter U on a Boolean
algebra B is the preimage of 1 under some pure state ω of B, and ω is normal
if and only if U is closed under countable meets. For any non-zero element
A ∈ B, the set UA = {B ∈ B : A ≤ B} is a filter, and is an ultrafilter if A is
an atom in B. In this case, UA is called the principal ultrafilter generated by
A. It is easy to see then that principal ultrafilters give rise to normal pure
states.
The discussion of this paper focuses on two Boolean algebras: The σ-
complete Boolean algebra B(R) of Borel subsets ofR, and its quotient B(R)/N
by the ideal of Lebesgue measure zero sets. Recall that B(R) is the (Boolean)
σ-algebra generated by the open subsets of R. The logical operations on B(R)
are just the set-theoretic operations ∩ (intersection), ∪ (union), and ∼ (com-
plement in R). Clearly, B(R) is purely atomic; i.e., for each S ∈ B(R) there
is some atomic element A ∈ B(R) (i.e., a singleton set) such that A ⊆ S.
Thus, by the considerations adduced above, B(R) has an abundance of pure
normal states.
Let N denote the family of Lebesgue measure zero sets in B(R). We
define an equivalence relation ≈ on B(R) by setting S1 ≈ S2 just in case
S14S2 ∈ N , where S14S2 = (S1\S2) ∪ (S2\S1). For each S ∈ B(R), let
pi(S) = {S′ ∈ B(R) : S′ ≈ S}, and let
B(R)/N = {pi(S) : S ∈ B(R)} . (3)
For any countable family {pi(Si)} of elements in B(R)/N , we define,
∨∞i=1pi(Si) = pi (∪∞i=1Si) . (4)
(This is well-defined since N is a σ-ideal.) For pi(S) ∈ B(R)/N , we set
¬pi(S) = pi(∼S). It then follows that 〈B(R)/N ,∨,¬〉 is a σ-complete Boolean
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algebra. It is also possible to show — although I do not prove it here — that
B(R)/N has no atoms; i.e., for each nonzero A ∈ B(R)/N , there is some
nonzero B ∈ B(R)/N such that B < A. This, in fact, is equivalent to the
nonexistence of pure normal states for B(R)/N , which I do prove below in
Proposition 1.
2.2 The position observable in QM
It is well-known that no wavefunctions ψ in a Hilbert space give a probability
density |ψ|2 that is focused at one point. In this section, I will show that this
well-known fact may be described in purely logical terms as the nonexistence
of pure normal states on the Boolean algebra B(R)/N .
The state space of quantum mechanics is obtained by requiring an irre-
ducible representation of the canonical commutation relation (CCR):
[Q̂, P̂ ] = i~I, (5)
by operators Q̂, P̂ on some Hilbert space H. In its integrated (Weyl) form,
there is a unique (up to unitary isomorphism) representation of the CCR on
the Hilbert space L2(R) of equivalence classes of square integrable functions
from R into C [20, 23]. (Two functions are equivalent just in case they agree
except possibly on a set of measure zero.) In this representation, the position
operator Q̂ is defined on a dense subset of L2(R) by the equation
(Q̂ψ)(q) = q · ψ(q) . (6)
A “proposition” about the position of the particle is then given by a projec-
tion operator which is a function of Q̂. In particular, for each S ∈ B(R), we
define an operator E(S) on L2(R) by the equation
(E(S)ψ)(q) = χS(q) · ψ(q). (7)
The set OQ = {E(S) : S ∈ B(R)} is a σ-complete Boolean algebra of projec-
tion operators on the Hilbert space H, and E is a Boolean σ-homomorphism
from B(R) onto OQ. Moreover, E(S) = 0 if and only if S has Lebesgue
measure zero. Thus, the kernel of the mapping E is N , and (by the first
isomorphism theorem for rings) OQ is isomorphic to the quotient Boolean
algebra B(R)/N . (E is usually called the spectral measure for Q̂.)
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Now, every wavefunction ψ ∈ H gives rise to a normal state ρψ on OQ in
the standard way:
ρψ(E(S)) := 〈ψ|E(S)ψ〉 =
∫
R
χS(q)|ψ(q)|2dq =
∫
S
|ψ(q)|2dq. (8)
However, it follows from purely logical considerations that there cannot be
normal “eigenstates” for Q̂.
Proposition 1. There are no pure normal states of B(R)/N .
Proof. Let ω be a pure state of B(R)/N , and let U = ω−1(1) be the corre-
sponding ultrafilter. (Case 1) Suppose that pi(S) 6∈ U for all compact subsets
S of R. For each n ∈ N, let An = [−n, n]. Then, pi(An) 6∈ U and since U is
an ultrafilter, pi(∼An) = ¬pi(An) ∈ U . However,
∧∞n=1pi(∼An) = pi (∩∞n=1 ∼An) = 0, (9)
and therefore U is not closed under countable meets. (Case 2) If pi(S) ∈ U
for some compact set S in R, then U contains pi(Fλ) where Fλ is the family
of open neighborhoods of some point λ ∈ R. For each n ∈ N, let
Bn =
(
λ− n−1, λ+ n−1) . (10)
Then, pi(Bn) ∈ U for each n ∈ N. However,
∧∞n=1pi(Bn) = pi (∩∞n=1Bn) = pi ({λ}) = 0, (11)
since {λ} has Lebesgue measure zero. Thus, ∧∞n=1pi(Bn) 6∈ U and U is again
not closed under countable meets.
Thus, assuming that quantum theory is descriptively complete, and that
quantum states must be σ-additive, |ψ|2 can not be interpreted as a measure
of our ignorance of the true (pure) state of individual particles in the en-
semble. Some philosophers draw the moral from this that quantum theory is
teaching us something new about the nature of continuous quantities, namely
that we should not think or talk about continuous quantities possessing point
values, nor should we think or talk about statistical states as distributions
over point-valued states. For example, Fine [8] argues that we should think
of statistical state ρψ as a map that assigns a set, rather than a numerical
value, to Q̂. In particular,
ρψ(Q̂) :=
⋂ {S : ρψ(E(S)) = 1 } . (12)
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Of course, ρψ(Q̂) will never be a singleton, and — perhaps contrary to our
intuitions — the statement that the particle lies in S is a maximally specific
description of the location of the particle.
Teller [21] agrees with Fine that a statistical state should be interpreted
not as a mixture of value states, but as assigning a “partless” set value.
Nonetheless, Teller does recognize that this description of the location of
the particle can be misleading: it suggests — contrary to the predictions of
quantum theory — that no matter where we look in S, we will find a “piece”
of the particle. Teller suggests, however, that we should think of the property
“being located in S” as including,
“a collection of dispositions or potentialities to manifest a more
refined position of the same nature whenever a more refined mea-
surement interaction takes place.” (p. 357)
Thus, Teller seems to be claiming that the probability distribution |ψ|2 it-
self gives a maximally specific description of an individual element in the
ensemble.
Teller claims, moreover, that this dual property/disposition nature of po-
sition in QM is “nothing exceptional;” in fact, it is just like the color white
which is “a manifest property and at the same time an array of disposi-
tions” (ibid). This analogy to color, however, seems to show exactly what
leaves us uneasy about Teller’s proposal. In the case of color (e.g., white),
we can explain an object’s dispositions to appear certain ways in certain
contexts in terms of categorical properties of the object (viz., the chemi-
cal composition of its surface). On the other hand, Teller is claiming that a
quantum-mechanical particle must have irreducibly probabilistic dispositions
with no categorical basis (apart from, perhaps, ψ itself, which is difficult to
see as anything other than a catalog of those dispositions). While quantum
mechanics does present us with cases where we cannot fulfill classical ideals
of explanation, I do not think Teller’s account of position is one of these
cases.
2.3 The ignorance interpretation in classical mechan-
ics
According to Teller, these irreducibly probabilistic dispositions are a peculiar
feature of quantum mechanics. Unlike the quantum case, the probabilities
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in classical mechanics may be thought of as measures of our ignorance of the
precise state:
“In the context of classical physics the outcome of an inexact
measurement may be described as a probability distribution over
exact values, and we know how to state what this means: There
is a probability (interpreted as a relative frequency, subjective
degree of belief, or propensity) for the value of the measured
quantity to have one or another of the exact values in the support
of the distribution.” (p. 352)
Let us attempt, then, to give a mathematically rigorous description of this
purported distinction between the classical and quantum cases.
A classical particle moving in one dimension has a phase space R2, with
one coordinate for the position Q of the particle, and the other coordinate
for the momentum P = m · (dQ/dt) of the particle. We may think of Borel
subsets of R2 as representing statements that ascribe properties to the par-
ticle. (For background material, see Chap. 1 of Ref. 22.) A dynamical
variable is represented by a measurable, real-valued function F on phase
space. For example, the position of the particle is represented by the func-
tion F ((q, p)) = q. For any Borel set S in R, F−1(S) consists precisely of
those “states” (i.e., points in phase space) for which the value of F lies in
S. F−1 (considered as a set mapping) is in fact a Boolean σ-homomorphism
from B(R) onto some Boolean subalgebra BF of B(R2). For example, the dis-
junctive proposition “The value of F lies either in S1 or in S2” is represented
formally by
F−1(S1 ∪ S2) = F−1(S1) ∪ F−1(S2). (13)
Consider now the completely classical example of a person (or machine)
Bob throwing darts at a (one-dimensional) dartboard. Since we are ignorant
of the factors that influence each individual throw, we assign a probability
density ρ to the points on the dartboard (represented here by R). Now, just
as in the quantum-mechanical case, the distribution ρ on R defines a mixed
normal state on BF by means of the equation
ρ(F−1(S)) =
∫
R
χS(q)ρ(q) dq =
∫
S
ρ(q) dq. (14)
Any particular dart in the “ensemble” should, however, be characterized by
a pure state on BF . (i.e., there is some point λ ∈ R such that the dart has
8
probability 1 of hitting that point). And, in fact, everything works out fine
in this case since there are pure normal states of BF . Indeed, the atoms in
BF are just lines in R2 on which F is constant: Aλ = {(q, p) : F ((q, p)) = λ}.
Since each atom in a Boolean algebra gives rise to a pure normal state, there
is a normal pure state ωλ of BF defined explicitly by the condition that
ωλ(S) = 1 if and only if Aλ ⊆ S. Conversely, if ω is a pure normal state of
BF , then ω = ωλ for some λ ∈ R.1 Thus, the pure normal states on BF are in
one-to-one correspondence with the sets on which F takes a constant value.
Finally, it is easy to see that the distribution ρ does admit interpretation as
a measure of ignorance over the pure normal states, namely ρ =
∫
ωλdρ.
However, before we grant that there is a fundamental difference here
between the quantum and classical cases, let’s think a bit more carefully
about the interpretation of the mathematical objects we’ve been dealing with.
In particular, an element F−1(S) ∈ BF is interpreted as a statement that
ascribes a property to the particle, namely the statement “The particle is
located in S.” Now take an element E(S) ∈ OQ. Is it the quantum equivalent
of the classical statement F−1(S); i.e., an ascription of a property “located
in S”? If we interpret E(S) this way, then it is trivially true that a quantum
particle cannot have a sharp location:
Let λ ∈ R. Then E({λ}) = 0 since {λ} has Lebesgue measure
zero. Thus, the proposition “The particle is located at λ” is a
contradiction. QED
Thus the property ascription interpretation of elements of OQ rules out our
being able to describe particles with sharp locations. However, the property
ascription interpretation is not the traditional interpretation of projection
operators in quantum theory. According to the traditional interpretation,
the projection operators are observables or experimental propositions. This
is sometimes made precise by saying that E(S) represents the statement:
“A measurement of Q̂ will yield a value lying in S.”
Under this interpretation, E({λ}) = 0 does not entail that a particle cannot
be located at λ; it simply means that it is false (in fact, a contradiction)
to say that any measurement of Q̂ will yield the precise value λ. (This,
1First show that ω(F−1(S)) = 1 for some compact set S. Standard topological ar-
guments then show that ω(F−1(V )) = 1 for every open neighborhood V or some point
λ ∈ R. Now use the fact that {λ} is the intersection of a countable family of open sets.
9
for example, may be the result of the fact that precise measurements of Q̂
are impossible.) But now, if OQ consists of observables, while BF consists
of property ascriptions, differences in the state spaces of the two logics do
not necessarily reflect differences in the descriptive resources of classical and
quantum mechanics.
The distinction between observables (experimental propositions) and prop-
erty ascriptions should not be drawn only in quantum physics. For example,
although F−1(λ) ∈ BF is a classical property ascription, it is doubtful that
any classical experiment ever determines that the value of the quantity F is
the exact real number λ; and thus the proposition “Val(F ) = λ” is not really
an experimental proposition — even in the classical case. The same intuition
is expressed by Birkhoff and von Neumann [1] who claim that, it would be
absurd,
“to call an “experimental proposition,” the assertion that the
angular momentum (in radians per second) of the earth around
the sun was at a particular instant a rational number!” (p. 825)
Indeed, what experiment would we perform in order to determine that it was
a rational number?
There will certainly be a number of different ways to give a mathemat-
ically precise account of the notion of approximate measurement. Here,
though, I will just explain briefly von Neumann’s [24, 595-598] account, with-
out trying to argue positively for its merits. I wish simply to show that ac-
cording to von Neumann’s account of approximate measurement in classical
physics, the logic of classical experimental propositions (for one continuous
quantity) is mathematically identical to OQ.
The fact that measurements are of arbitrarily good, but always finite,
precision is given formal statement by von Neumann as follows:
For each n ∈ N, the value space Ω of F may be partitioned into a
finite or countably infinite family of measurable sets {N (n)i : i =
1, 2, . . .}, of which each two have measure-zero overlap. We may
do this so that the partition {N (n+1)i } is strictly finer than {N (n)i }
for each n, and if we let δn denote the maximum diameter of the
sets in {N (n)i }, then δn → 0. We say that some procedure is a
F -measurement of n-th level precision just in case it determines
the i ∈ N such that Val(F ) ∈ N (n)i . Then, F -measurements of all
finite levels of precision are possible.
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With this as the basic principle of measurement, von Neumann proves:
For any set S ∈ R, we can determine via measurement (up to an arbitrary
level of confidence) whether Val(F ) ∈ S, if and only if S has non-vanishing
Lebesgue measure. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine with any
good level of confidence that Val(F ) lies in a Lebesgue measure zero set —
in agreement with the intuition that “Val(F ) = λ” and “Val(F ) is a rational
number” are not experimental propositions. Furthermore, if two subsets
S1, S2 ∈ B(R) agree except possibly on a set of measure zero, then there is
no way to determine that Val(F ) ∈ S1\S2 or that Val(F ) ∈ S2\S1. Thus,
two elements S1, S2 ∈ BF define the same classical observable just in case
S14S2 = (S1\S2) ∪ (S2\S1) ∈ N . But then the logic of classical observables
OF for the quantity F is also the quotient Boolean algebra B(R)/N . (See
p. 825 of Ref. 1.)
Now, Teller claims that,
“...if we believe that systems possess exact values for continu-
ous quantities, classical theory contains the descriptive resources
for attributing such values to the system, whether or not mea-
surements are taken to be imprecise in some sense. Quantum
mechanics has no such descriptive resource” (p. 352).
Apparently, then, Teller endorses the claim that classical mechanics does
have states assigning exact values to a continuous quantity, even after we
take into account the fact that absolutely precise measurements are not pos-
sible. However, when we take that into account, the logic of classical experi-
mental propositions OF is isomorphic to the logic of quantum experimental
propositions OQ. Moreover, if we require quantum states to be σ-additive
(thereby depriving quantum theory of the resources to describe exact val-
ues), we should also require classical states to be σ-additive — which would
also deprive classical theory of the resources to describe exact values. But
this conclusion cannot be right: Classical theory does already have these re-
sources to describe exact values, namely points in phase space. The difficulty,
then, is not with a lack of resources; but rather with the connection between
the theoretical description of point values (viz., pure normal states on BF )
and the “surface” description given by states on OF . I will argue in the next
section that the solution to this difficulty is that the “hidden states” give rise
to finitely-additive (singular) states on OF .
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2.4 Singular states
Let S be any family of elements in B(R)/N with the finite meet property.
That is, for any finite family {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ S, we have
A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An 6= 0. (15)
Then, the Ultrafilter Extension Theorem [19, p. 339] entails that there is
some 2-valued homomorphism ω on B(R)/N such that ω(A) = 1 for all
A ∈ S. In particular, B(R)/N does have pure states, even though they are
not σ-additive. Furthermore, any probability distribution ρ on B(R)/N can
be written explicitly as a mixture of pure states; i.e., there is some measure
µ on the pure state space of B(R)/N such that
ρ =
∫
ωα dµ(α) . (16)
Thus, the distribution ρ does admit an ignorance interpretation; viz., it mea-
sures our ignorance of the (singular) state which describes an individual
particle in the ensemble.
The pure states on B(R)/N should be thought of as “surface states.”
That is, each pure state on B(R)/N gives a consistent catalog of sure-fire
responses of the system to all possible measurements. I will now argue that
for each λ ∈ R, there is at least one surface state whose predictions can be
interpreted as consistent with the fact that Val(F ) = λ, and inconsistent
with the fact that Val(F ) = ξ for any ξ 6= λ.
Consider again the dart throwing example. According to the von Neu-
mann measurement theory, there is no experiment which would tell us the
real number λ at which the dart lands. However, we can rule out segments
of the dart board. In particular, choose some open segment V along the line.
Then, if the system responds 0 to the measurement pi(V ), we are entitled to
conclude that the dart did not land at any point in the segment V . In other
words, a necessary condition for the value of F to be λ in the state ω is that:
ω(pi(V )) = 1, for all V ∈ Fλ (∗)
where Fλ is the family of open neighborhoods of λ. Suppose, conversely,
that ω satisfies (∗) with respect to some point λ ∈ R. (If (∗) holds, we
say that the state ω converges to the point λ.) Then, for any other point ξ
along the line, there is some open neighborhood W of ξ which excludes λ. A
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measurement of pi(W ) in the state ω then shows that the dart did not land
at ξ. Thus, when ω converges to λ, the only interpretation consistent with
the von Neumann theory of measurement is that Val(F ) = λ; that is, the
“hidden” state of the system is given by some phase space point along the
line {(q, p) : F ((q, p)) = λ}.
Now consider again some mixed state ρ on B(R)/N . Then, ρ is a mixture
of pure states as in Eq. 16, and each pure state assigns some definite value to
F . (We do have to be sure that ρ falls off sufficiently quickly at infinity. See
Sec. 3 of Ref. 12.) Thus, this validates the idea that in classical mechanics,
the distribution ρ represents the “...probability for the value of the measured
quantity to have one or another of the exact values in the support of the
distribution.”
However, everything we have just said about singular states of B(R)/N
was entirely neutral as to whether we were discussing classical or quantum
mechanics. Thus, a wavefunction |ψ|2 may also be thought of as representing
a probability distribution for Q̂ to have one or another of the exact values
in the support of |ψ|2.2 According to Teller, though, even if there were some
mathematically acceptable method for describing sharp positions in QM,
doing so would not be physically acceptable:
“Such an extended physical theory would describe systems having
totally indeterminate momentum, not even highly localized to any
finite interval. Such systems would have an infinite expectation
value for their kinetic energy” (p. 353).
This argument, however, is not a criticism of singular states per se. Since the
energy observable is an unbounded operator, there are vectors in the Hilbert
space that are not in the domain of this observable, and so these vectors too
will assign “infinite kinetic energy” to the system. Thus, following Teller’s
reasoning here to its logical conclusion, not every (unit) vector in the Hilbert
space gives a physically realizable state; rather, only those vectors in the
domain of the energy observable give rise to physically realizable states. But
2According to Clifton [7, p. 32], the Bohm theory may be thought of as interpreting
each quantum state as a mixture of singular states which assign definite values to Q̂. It
remains to be seen, however, the extent to which singular states accurately represent the
hidden variables of the Bohm theory, including their dynamics. More generally, singular
states are used in [12] to generalize Bub and Clifton’s [2, 3] classification scheme for hidden
variable theories (which, in its original form, applied only to the case of finite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces).
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the same reasoning should also apply to vectors that are not in the domain
of some other physically relevant observable (such as Q̂). And once we’ve
cleansed the Hilbert space of vectors not in the domains of all physically
relevant observables, would anything be left?
Besides these obvious retorts, it is not completely clear what is meant by
Teller’s talk about assigning infinite expectation values. What we do know
— in the case of pure (singular) states of OQ — is that these states cannot
be thought of as assigning some finite expectation values to the energy ob-
servable. (Precisely: Each pure, convergent state on OQ gives rise to a mixed
state on the logic of experimental propositions about energy, and measure
one of the pure states in its integral decomposition do not converge to a
finite value. See Ref. 12, Section 3.) It may be mathematically convenient,
then, to adjoin ∞ to the normal range of values, but we should not say that
these states assign “∞” to the energy observable. Rather, we should think
of this infinity — as we do of the infinities related to singularities in General
Relativity — as indicating the limits of the descriptive capabilities of our
theory. And if, with Teller, we take the theory to be descriptively complete,
then there is nothing more to describe about energy in these situations.
3 Potential difficulties with singular states
In the previous section, I have argued that singular states permit us to give
an ignorance interpretation of the probability distributions associated with
individual continuous quantities in QM. I imagine my reader may still not
be convinced, though, of the acceptability of singular states. In this section,
I will confirm that there are indeed difficulties with these singular states. In
the final section, however, I will show that these difficulties can be remedied
by taking a more modest view of the measurements that can be made on a
continuous quantity.
It would be quite natural to think that if we pick a point λ ∈ R, it
determines uniquely a pure state ω on B(R)/N that converges to λ. There
is, however, a difficulty. Suppose we divide the screen (or dartboard) into
two halves A = {q : q > λ} and B = {q : q < λ}. Then,
pi(A) ∨ pi(B) = pi(A) ∨ pi(B) ∨ pi({λ}) = pi(R) = I, (17)
since {λ} has Lebesgue measure zero. Thus,
ω(pi(A)) + ω(pi(B)) = 1, (18)
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while either ω(pi(A)) = 0 or ω(pi(B)) = 0. Thus, any pure state ω must
assign 1 to either pi(A) or pi(B), but not to both. What would be the right
answer for a state in which the particle is located at λ?
Actually, it is easy to show that both value assignments are consistent
with the particle being located at λ. Indeed, let S1 = Fλ ∪ {pi(A)} and let
S2 = Fλ∪{pi(B)}. Since both S1 and S2 have the finite meet property, there
is an ultrafilter U1 which contains S1 and an ultrafilter U2 which contains S2.
Since U1 and U2 both converge to λ, both should be interpreted as surface
manifestations of some “hidden” state in which the particle is located at λ.
On the other hand, the particle’s being in some hidden state (λ, p), gives no
information concerning its disposition to respond to a measurement of pi(A).
The apparent mismatch between hidden states and surface states is, in
fact, quite severe.
Proposition 2. For each λ ∈ R, there are at least ℵ0 distinct ultrafilters on
B(R)/N that converge to λ.
In order to prove this proposition, we will first require a lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that {Bj : j ∈ J} is a family of open subsets of R such
that Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ when i 6= j and such that λ ∈ clo(Bj) for all j ∈ J . Then,
there is a family {Uj : j ∈ J} of distinct ultrafilters on B(R)/N such that
pi(Fλ) ⊆ Uj for all j ∈ J .
Proof. Let {Bj : j ∈ J} be given as above. For each j ∈ J , let
Sj = pi(Fλ) ∪ {pi(Bj)}. (19)
From the Ultrafilter Extension Theorem, Sj is contained in a Boolean ultra-
filter Uj if and only if the meet of any finite collection of elements in Sj is
nonzero. Let {pi(U1), pi(U2), . . . , pi(Un)} ⊆ Sj. If Ui ∈ Fλ for each i, then
∩ni=1Ui is an open set that contains λ. If U1 = Bj, and Ui ∈ Fλ for i ≥ 2,
then ∩ni=2Ui is an open set that contains λ, and since λ ∈ clo(Bj), ∩ni=1Ui is
a nonempty open set. In either case, the open set O := ∩ni=1Ui is nonempty.
Since Lebesgue measure does not vanish on any nonempty open set, we have
∧ni=1pi(Ui) = pi (∩ni=1Ui) = pi(O) 6= 0. (20)
Thus, there is an ultrafilter Uj that contains Sj. Since pi(Bi) ∧ pi(Bj) = 0
when i 6= j, it follows that Ui 6= Uj when i 6= j.
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Proof of the proposition. We will consider the case where λ = 0. In light of
the lemma, it will suffice to construct a family {Bn : n ∈ N} of open subsets
of R such that Bn ∩ Bm = ∅ when n 6= m and such that 0 ∈ clo(Bn) for all
n ∈ N.
For each n ∈ N ∪ {0}, let an = 2−n. For each n,m ∈ N, let bnm =
(an + an−1)/2m, and let
Am =
∞⋃
n=1
(an, bnm). (21)
Note that Am ⊃ Am+1 for all m ∈ N, and in fact Am − Am+1 has nonempty
interior. Thus, if we set
Bm = int(Am − Am+1), (22)
then Bm is a nonempty open set. We must show that Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ when
i 6= j and that 0 ∈ clo(Bi) for all i. Suppose that i 6= j. We may assume
that i+ 1 ≤ j, in which case Ai+1 ⊇ Aj, and
Bi ∩Bj ⊆ (Ai − Ai+1) ∩ (Aj − Aj+1) ⊆ Aj − Ai+1 = ∅. (23)
It is easy to verify that the sequence {bnm : n ∈ N} is in clo(Bm) for each
m. But limn bnm = 0 and since clo(clo(Bm)) = clo(Bm), it follows that
0 ∈ clo(Bm).
Thus, even though we are able to explain probabilistic dispositions as
measures of ignorance of sure-fire dispositions, we are not able to further
reduce the latter to categorical location properties. So, one could still think
that attributing categorical location properties is objectionable on the grounds
that these attributions are explanatorily bankrupt.
There is also a serious practical obstacle for using singular states as the
explanans for a reduction of probabilistic dispositions; namely, none of these
singular states can be explicitly defined. By saying that these singular states
cannot be “explicitly defined,” I mean to contrast this with the pure normal
states of B(R) given by principal ultrafilters, as well as with mixed normal
states on B(R)/N . First of all, it is quite trivial to give an explicit definition
of a principal ultrafilter on B(R). Indeed, once I choose some λ ∈ R, then
(trivially) if you give me a Borel set S, then I can tell you whether or not
S is in the principal ultrafilter generated by {λ}. We have also seen that
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any quantum-mechanical wavefunction ψ defines a mixed normal state ρψ on
B(R)/N by means of the formula
ρψ(pi(S)) =
∫
S
|ψ(q)|2dq. (24)
Since it is possible to explicitly define a wavefunction ψ, Eq. 24 gives an
explicit recipe for computing the value ρψ(pi(S)) for any Borel set S.
On the other hand, although we “know” that there are ultrafilters (i.e.,
pure states) on B(R)/N , we do not know this because someone has con-
structed an example of such an ultrafilter. In order to obtain an ultrafilter,
we note that a certain (explicitly defined) family S of elements in B(R)/N has
the finite meet property, and then we invoke the Ultrafilter Extension Theo-
rem to extend S to an ultrafilter U . This extension procedure is a paradigm
example of nonconstructive mathematics: We are told that there is some
pure state ω on B(R)/N , but we are not given a recipe for determining the
value ω(A) for an arbitrary element A ∈ B(R)/N .
A strong case can be made that the sometimes imprecise distinction be-
tween “giving an explicit example” and “proving existence (nonconstruc-
tively),” corresponds to a precise distinction in the strength of the set-
theoretic axioms used to prove the existence of the object in question (see
Ref. 19). In particular, many concrete mathematical objects (such as the
Real numbers [17, Appendix]) are constructed using the Principle of Recur-
sive Constructions:
(PRC) Suppose X is a non-empty set, and let a function G be
given from the set of finite sequences in X into P(X)\{∅}. Then
there exists exactly one function F : N 7→ X such that F (0) ∈
G(∅) and F (n) ∈ G(F (0), . . . , F (n− 1)) for all n > 0.
PRC is equivalent in ZF to the axiom of Dependent Choices [14, p. 147]:
(DC) If R is a binary relation on a nonempty set X such that for
every x ∈ X there exists a y ∈ X with 〈x, y〉 ∈ R, then there exists
a sequence (xn)n∈N of elements of X such that 〈xn, xn+1〉 ∈ R for
every n ∈ N.
DC is a very weak form of the Axiom of Choice: ZF+DC entails the Axiom
of Countable Choice, but ZF+DC does not entail the Ultrafilter Extension
Theorem, nor does it entail any of the “paradoxical” consequences of ZF+AC
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(e.g. the Banach-Tarski paradox) [19, Chap. 6]. In fact, a good case can
be made that applied mathematics makes use only of those objects in the
ZF+DC universe [26]. For example, all theorems of classical (19th century)
analysis, and even all theorems of the traditional Hilbert space formalism of
quantum mechanics can be proved in ZF+DC [10].
Following [19], let us say that a mathematical object is intangible just
in case that object exists in the ZF+AC universe, but that object cannot
be proved to exist in the ZF+DC universe. For example, a free ultrafilter
on N (i.e., an ultrafilter containing all subsets of N whose complements are
finite) is an intangible [18]. We now show that pure states of B(R)/N are
also intangibles.
Proposition 3. It cannot be proved in ZF+DC that there is a pure state of
B(R)/N .
Proof. Let WUF (weak-ultrafilter principle) denote the statement that there
is a free ultrafilter on N, and let PS denote the statement that there is a pure
state on B(R)/N . We must show that ZF+DC+¬PS is consistent. Since
ZF+DC+¬WUF is consistent [18], it will suffice to show that ZF+DC`
(PS→WUF). Thus, suppose that PS holds; i.e., there is an ultrafilter U on
B(R)/N . By Prop. 1, U is not closed under countable meets; i.e., there is a
family {Pn : n ∈ N} of elements of B(R)/N such that Pn ∈ U for all n ∈ N,
but ∧n∈NPn 6∈ U . (It’s important to note that Prop. 1 uses no choice axiom
stronger than DC.) Define a family J of subsets of N by
J ∈ J ⇐⇒ ∧n∈JPn 6∈ U . (25)
It is easily verified that J is an ultrafilter in P(N) that contains all subsets
of N whose complements are finite.
4 The logic of unsharp experimental propo-
sitions
I have argued that it is possible to give an ignorance interpretation of the
probabilities associated with a continuous quantity in quantum mechanics. In
order to do so, however, I had to make use of singular states, which turn out to
have some pretty odd properties that militate against their playing a serious
role in explaining a particle’s probabilistic dispositions. Some might attribute
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the oddities encountered in the last section to the fact that we permitted
ourselves to use states that are not σ-additive. On the contrary, I will now
argue that the difficulty is not with the states but with the observables: We
were trying to account for too many measurement outcomes.
If we take B(R)/N to be in one-to-one correspondence with possible ex-
periments, then Prop. 2 shows that there are experiments whose outcomes
could distinguish two states, both of which correspond to one point λ ∈ R.
If, however, these distinguishing experiments cannot in fact be performed,
then these two states corresponding to λ are empirically equivalent. In this
section, I will show how to make this idea precise using the fact that real
experimental questions are always “unsharp.”
Consider again a person, Bob, throwing darts at a one-dimensional dart-
board. With the knowledge we have of Bob’s skills, we choose a region S on
the dartboard which we feel confident Bob can hit on 100 consecutive throws.
Since we don’t have time, though, to watch each of Bob’s throws, we rig a
device to keep score. In particular, each time a dart hits the board, we get
a printout that records y when the dart lands in S and that records n when
the dart lands outside of S. Now, after Bob has made his 100 throws, we
take a look at the printout: there are 98 y’s and 2 n’s. Do we then conclude
that Bob was not as skilled a dart thrower as we thought? Not necessarily.
Perhaps it was our score-keeping device, not Bob, which failed on those two
counts. Or, perhaps some environmental factor interfered with two of Bob’s
throws. In any case, the point is that in a real experimental situation, the
measuring device itself and the environment introduce factors of uncertainty
which have to be taken into account when interpreting measurement results.
To make the imperfections in the experimental setup mathematically pre-
cise within the confines of the standard Hilbert space formalism of QM, we
can associate a confidence measure e with a given measuring device. (Here
I follow Busch et al. [4].) If, using this measuring device, we attempt to test
for the claim “the particle is in S,” then what we actually measure is the
“smeared” observable
Ee(S) :=
∫
R
e(q)E(S + q) dq = (χS ∗ e)(Q̂). (26)
Here the operation ∗ is the convolution product defined by
(f ∗ g)(q0) :=
∫
R
f(q) g(q0 − q) dq. (27)
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For a fixed confidence measure e, the mapping S 7→ Ee(S) is a positive
operator valued (POV) measure on (R,B(R)). If S1 and S2 are disjoint Borel
sets, then we represent the disjunctive question “Is the particle in S1 ∪ S2?”
formally by
Ee(S1)⊕ Ee(S2) := Ee(S1) + Ee(S2). (28)
The conjunctive question “Is the particle in S1 and S2?” is represented by
the operator Ee(S1 ∩ S2). In general, however, it is not the case that
Ee(S1 ∩ S2) = Ee(S1)Ee(S2). (29)
In fact, the operator on the right-hand side of Eq. 29 will not generally be
in the range of Ee. Finally, the question “Is the particle in the complement
of S?” is represented formally by
¬Ee(S) := Ee (R\S) . (30)
We obtain the standard projection valued (PV) measure E if we apply
the above construction to the case in which we have absolute confidence in
the accuracy of our measuring apparatus. Formally, if we let δ be the Dirac
delta function, then
Eδ(S) = (χS ∗ δ)(Q̂) = χS(Q̂) = E(S), (31)
for all Borel sets S. On the other hand, if e has non-zero deviation (i.e., e
is an integrable function), then for each Borel set S, (χS ∗ e) is a uniformly
continuous function [13, Prop. 3.2].
Realistically, then, the family E of experimental propositions about the
location of the particle should consist only of elements of the form Ee(S),
where e is some confidence function with non-zero deviation. Let’s be gen-
erous, though, and suppose that E contains all operators of the form f(Q̂)
where f is a uniformly continuous function from R into [0, 1]. If we say that
A ⊥ B just in case A+B ≤ I, then we may extend the exclusive disjunction
defined in Eq. 28 by setting
A⊕B := A+B, (32)
when A ⊥ B. It is easy to verify then that (E ,⊕,0, I) is an effect algebra,
or unsharp quantum logic [5, 6, 9]. (Recall that every Boolean algebra is an
effect algebra if we set: A ⊥ B iff. A∧B = 0, and A⊕B = A∨B [9].) Thus,
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in particular, for each A ∈ E , there is a unique element ¬A = I−A ∈ E such
that A ⊥ ¬A and A ⊕ ¬A = I. For A,B ∈ E , we say that A ≤ B just in
case there is some C ⊥ A such that A⊕ C = B. A state on E is a mapping
ω : E 7→ [0, 1] such that ω(I) = 1 and
ω(A⊕B) = ω(A) + ω(B), (33)
whenever A⊕B is defined. From this it follows that whenever A,B ∈ E and
A ≤ B, then ω(A) ≤ ω(B) and
ω(B − A) = ω(B)− ω(A). (34)
We say that a state ω of E is pure just in case: If ω = aρ+(1−a)τ , for some
a ∈ (0, 1), then ω = ρ = τ . Unlike the Boolean case, however, a pure state
of a general effect algebra may take on any value in the interval [0, 1]. (For
example, even if Bob hits the bullseye on each try out of 100, our less than
ideal score-keeper might only credit him with only, say, 98 hits.)
I began this section with the idea that there are too many observables in
OQ ∼= B(R)/N , and that we should be more modest about what can actually
be measured. Let me show precisely, now, how the effect algebra E does
represent a more modest perspective on what the experimental propositions
about position truly are.
Both E and OQ are subsets of the algebra RQ of all operators of the
form f(Q̂), where f is some Borel function from R into C. Although the
intersection of E and OQ contains only 0 and I, we should think of E as
containing a much smaller set of observables than OQ. Indeed, any element
in E may be uniformly approximated by linear combinations of elements in
OQ (by the spectral theorem). Thus, any pure state ω on OQ will give
rise to a unique pure state ω|E on E . (This slight abuse of notation is
justified by the fact that pure states on OQ extend uniquely to pure states
of the von Neumann algebra RQ.) On the other hand, since the family
of uniformly continuous functions is closed under linear combinations and
uniform limits, no element of OQ (other than 0 and I) can be approximated
by linear combinations of elements in E . Thus, E is “coarser grained” thanOQ
in the sense that two states which give different outcomes for measurements in
OQ may give identical outcomes for all measurements in E . And, indeed, the
elements of E do not permit us to distinguish between states that correspond
to a common point λ ∈ R.
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Proposition 4. Let ω, ρ be pure states of OQ, both of which converge to λ.
Then,
ω(f(Q̂)) = ρ(f(Q̂)) = f(λ), (35)
for all f(Q̂) ∈ E.
Proof. See Prop. 3.4 of Ref. 12.
This proposition gives us everything we want. For each λ ∈ R, there
is precisely one (explicitly defined) pure state ωλ of E corresponding to λ.
(Moreover, it can be shown that every “convergent” state of E is of this form.
See Proposition 5 in the appendix.) Therefore, any statistical state ρψ of E
decomposes as an integral
ρψ =
∫
R
ωλ dµ(λ), (36)
which permits interpretation as a measure of our ignorance of the precise,
categorical location property of individual particles in the ensemble.
One might now object that, after all, I have abandoned the standard
formulation of QM for a richer formulation that permits ascription of precise
values to continuous quantities. In one trivial sense, this is true: the singular
states I have invoked are not typically mentioned in standard formulations
of QM (e.g., von Neumann [25] or Mackey [16]). However, singular states are
implicit in the standard formulation of QM, in the sense that they share all
features of vector states which entitle the latter to be considered candidates
for representing physical reality. Thus, while von Neumann and Mackey did
not avail themselves of singular states, there is no reason in principal why
they could not have done so.
I have also gone beyond von Neumann and Mackey by making use of
positive-operator valued measures. However, since the range of a POV mea-
sure consists simply of operators acting on Hilbert space, it is not clear why
one would think of this as a departure from the Hilbert-space formulation.
Of course, I have departed from one popular interpretation of the formal-
ism according to which spectral projections of any quantity can, in some
contexts, represent properties of the system. Instead, I have claimed, these
spectral projections should be interpreted as “experimental propositions;”
and, correspondingly, arbitrary POV measures represent varying degrees of
confidence we have in our measuring apparatuses.
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In the case where we have less than perfect confidence in our measuring
apparatus, it is clear how to relate an underlying description in which a
continuous quantity possesses a sharp value with a surface description in
terms of possible measurement outcomes. We must follow this strategy not
only in quantum mechanics, but also in classical mechanics. On the level of
individual continuous quantities, the theories are on a par.
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A Appendix
Lemma 2. Let ω be a state of E. Then ω(aA) = aω(A) for all A ∈ E and
a ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Suppose first that a = 1/2. Then, ω(A) − ω((1/2)A) = ω((1/2)A)
and so ω((1/2)A) = (1/2)ω(A). It then follows easily by induction that
ω(aA) = aω(A) when a = 2−n for some n ∈ N.
Suppose now that a is a diadic rational; i.e., a = m/2n for some m,n ∈ N,
where m < 2n. Note then that
m
2n
A =
1
2n
A⊕ 1
2n
A⊕ · · · ⊕ 1
2n
A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
, (37)
and so
ω
(m
2n
A
)
= mω
(
1
2n
A
)
=
m
2n
ω(A). (38)
Finally, let a be an arbitrary element in (0, 1). Then, a = limn an for some
strictly decreasing sequence {an} ⊆ (0, 1) of diadic rationals. Now, for every
N ∈ N, there is some M ∈ N such that
anA− aA ≤ 2−NI, (39)
for all n ≥M , and therefore
ω (anA− aA) ≤ 2−N , (40)
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for all n ≥M . We may also assume that an − a ≤ 2−N when n ≥M . Thus,
|ω(aA)− aω(A)| = |ω(aA)− ω(anA) + anω(A)− aω(A)| (41)
≤ |ω(aA)− ω(anA)|+ |anω(A)− aω(A)| (42)
≤ 2−N + 2−N . (43)
Since this is true for all N ∈ N, it follows that ω(aA) = aω(A).
There are pure states on E that assign 0 to all elements of the form Ee(S),
where S is a compact subset of R. (That such states exist can be seen from
the proof of Proposition 5 below.) When S is compact, then the function
f := (χS ∗ e) vanishes at infinity; i.e., for each  > 0, there in a N ∈ N such
that f(x) <  when |x| > N [13, Prop. 3.2]. This motivates the following
definition.
Definition. Let ω be a pure state of E . We say that ω converges just in case
ω(f(Q̂)) > 0 for some f that vanishes at infinity.
Proposition 5. Let ω be a convergent pure state of E. Then, ω(f(Q̂)) = f(λ)
for some λ ∈ R.
Proof. Recall that the Stone-Cech compactification βR of R is the unique
compact Hausdorff space such that every bounded continuous function f :
R 7→ C can be extended uniquely to a continuous function f : βR 7→ C. Let
BUC(R) denote the set of bounded, uniformly continuous functions from R
into C. Since a uniform limit of elements in BUC(R) is again in BUC(R),
it follows that there is a unique compact Hausdorff space γR such that every
f ∈ BUC(R) has a unique extension to a continuous function f : γR 7→ C.
We may refer to γR as the uniform compactification of R. Let C(γR) denote
the set of continuous functions from γR into C. Thus, there is an algebraic
isomorphism from BUC(R) onto C(γR) and we may identify E with the
family of functions in C(γR) with range [0, 1].
We show that every (pure) state ω of E has a unique extension to a (pure)
state ω̂ of the C∗-algebra C(γR). We may then appeal to the result that any
pure state ω̂ on C(γR) is of the form ω̂(f) = f(x0) for some x0 ∈ γR [15,
Corollary 3.4.2].
Let ω be a state of E . Let C+(γR) denote the set of functions from γR
into [0,+∞). If f ∈ C+(γR), then f/‖f‖ ∈ E and we may define
ω̂(f) := ‖f‖ · ω (f/‖f‖) . (44)
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Using Lemma 2, it is easy to see that ω̂ is homogenous with respect to
positive real numbers, and it is straightforward to verify that ω̂ is additive
over positive functions. Thus, ω̂ is an additive function from C+(γR) into
[0,∞). It follows then that ω̂ extends uniquely to a linear mapping from
C(γR) into C [19, Prop. 11.55].
Suppose now that ω is a pure state of E , and let ω̂ be the unique extension
of ω to C(γR) as defined above. Suppose that ω̂ = aρ+ (1− a)τ , where ρ, τ
are states of C(γR) and a ∈ (0, 1). Then ρ |E and τ |E are states of E , and
ω = aρ |E + (1 − a)τ |E . However, since ω is a pure state of E , we have
ω = ρ |E = τ |E and since extensions are unique, it follows that ω̂ = ρ = τ .
Thus, ω̂ is a pure state of C(γR).
Thus, there is some x0 ∈ γR such that ω̂(f) = f(x0) for each f ∈ C(γR).
We show that if x0 ∈ γR\R, then the state ω does not converge. Indeed,
since R is dense in γR, there is a net (xa)a∈A in R such that xa → x0. Let
f ∈ E be a function that vanishes at infinity. We show that f(x0) = 0. Let
 > 0 be given. Then, there is an N ∈ N such that f(x) <  for all x ∈ R with
|x| ≥ N . However, since the set [−N,N ] is compact in γR and x0 6∈ R, there
is some b ∈ A such that xa 6∈ [−N,N ] for all a ≥ b. Since f(x0) = lim f(xa),
f(x0) < . Since this is true for any  > 0, it follows that f(x0) = 0 and
ω(f) = 0.
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